In this paper, we study the position value for games in which partial cooperation exist, that is based on a union stable coalition system. The concept of basis is introduced for these systems, allowing for a de®nition of the position value. Moreover, an axiomatic characterization of the position value is provided for a speci®c class of union stable systems. Conditions under which convexity is inherited from the underlying game to the conference game, and the position value is a core vector of the restricted game are provided.
Introduction
In cooperative game theory, partial cooperation assumes that the formation of coalitions is restricted. Several models of partial cooperation have been proposed, among which are those derived from communication situations as introduced by Myerson [4] . This line of research was continued by Owen [8] , van den Nouweland and Borm [6] , Borm, Owen and Tijs [1] , van den Nouweland, Borm and Tijs [7] , and Potters and Reijnierse [9] .
In Myerson's model, the bilateral relations among the players are represented by means of an undirected graph and the feasible coalitions are those that induce connected subgraphs. However, partial cooperation can not always be modelled by a graph, so the communication model has been generalized in several directions, for instance towards conference structures by Myerson [5] and hypergraph communication situations by van den Nouweland, Borm and Tijs [7] .
In this article, we study partial cooperation structures, which satisfy the following property: Given any two feasible coalitions with a non-empty inter-Example 1. Let N f1; 2; 3; 4g and consider the union stable family given by: F ff1g; f3g; f1; 2g; f2; 3g; f2; 4g; f1; 2; 3g; f1; 2; 4g; f2; 3; 4g; Ng:
For the collection G ff1; 2g; f2; 3g; f2; 4gg, note that G 1 ff1; 2g; f2; 3g; f2; 4g; f1; 2; 3g; f1; 2; 4g; f2; 3; 4gg; G 2 G ff1; 2g; f2; 3g; f2; 4g; f1; 2; 3g; f1; 2; 4g; f2; 3; 4g; Ng:
Let F be a union stable system and G J F. If G is union stable, there can be feasible coalitions which can be written as the union of two feasible coalitions with a non-empty intersection. So, we can consider the following set:
Note that DG is composed of those feasible coalitions which can be written as the union of two distinct feasible coalitions with a non-empty intersection.
De®nition 3. Let F be a union stable system. The set BF FnDF, is called the basis of F, and the elements of BF are called supports of F. Example 2. Let N f1; 2; 3; 4g and consider the union stable system F ff1g; f2g; f3g; f4g; f1; 2g; f1; 3g; f3; 4g; f1; 2; 3g; f1; 3; 4g; f2; 3; 4g; f1; 2; 3; 4gg:
Clearly, the set DF ff1; 2; 3g; f1; 3; 4g; f1; 2; 3; 4gg hence the basis is BF ff1g; f2g; f3g; f4g; f1; 2g; f1; 3g; f3; 4g; f2; 3; 4gg.
By construction, the basis BF of F is unique, non-empty if F is nonempty, and satis®es the following properties.
In particular, if S A F and jSj U 2, then S A BF. Proposition 1. Let F be a union stable system. The map j : 2 F 3 2 F , de®ned by jG G is a closure operator, i.e.,
This result assures that F; j2 F , where j2 F fjG : G A 2 F g, is a closure space. From now on the closure space F; j2 F will be denoted by F; À and the elements of j2 F will be called closed. We can obtain: Proposition 2. Let F; À be the above closure space, and G A 2 F . Then, G is closed if and only if G is union stable.
Next, we provide two characterizations of the basis of a union stable system. Proposition 3. Let F be a union stable system and BF the basis of F. Then BF is the minimal subset of F such that BF F.
Proof. We ®rst prove that BF F. We have that BF J F, since BF J F and F is union stable. In order to prove the reverse inclusion, we use induction on the number of elements of feasible coalitions in F. Clearly, the minimal elements in F; J belong to the basis and hence to BF. Now, suppose F A BF for all F A F with jF j < p. Then, given F A F with jF j p, we have either F A BF or F B BF. In the ®rst case F A BF. Otherwise, F A DF and hence, there are two feasible coalitions S; T A F, S 0 F , T 0 F , S X T 0 q such that S W T F . By using the induction hypothesis, since jSj < p and jTj < p, we have that S; T A BF, and the union stability implies that F S W T A BF. Finally, we note that BF is a minimal subset of F such that BF F by construction. r Proposition 4. Let F be a union stable system and G J F union stable. Then, with exG : fG A G : GnfGg is union stableg it holds that exG BG.
Proof. We ®rst prove exG J BG. As BG G, G is the smallest union stable system that contains BG. Let G A exG. Then GnfGg is union stable. If G B BG, then BG J GnfGg H G and hence G would not be the smallest union stable system that contains BG. It remains to prove that BG J exG. For this, let B A BG. We show that GnfBg is union stable. Indeed, let S; T A GnfBg, with S X T 0 q. Since G is union stable, S W T A G. On the other hand,
The closure space F; À is a convex geometry (see Edelman and Jamison [2] ) since, if G J F is union stable, then exG BG G. The G-components of S are the maximal coalitions that belong to G and are contained in S. We denote by C G S the set of the G-components of S. Observe that the set C G S may be the empty set. Proof. Let F be union stable. Let S 1 , S 2 ; S 1 0 S 2 , be maximal feasible coalitions of S. If S 1 X S 2 0 q, then S 1 W S 2 A F since F is union stable and S 1 W S 2 J S. This contradicts the fact that S 1 and S 2 are F-components of S.
Conversely, assume for any S such that C F S 0 q, that its F-components form a partition of a subset of S. Suppose that F is not union stable, then there are A; B A F, with A X B 0 q and A W B B F. Hence, there must be an
This contradicts the fact that the F-components of A W B are disjoint. r
Notice that in general the F-components of S do not form a partition of S, but if F is a union stable system such that fig A F; Ei A N, then they do. Now, some relations between F-components, feasible coalitions, and supports of a union stable system are studied, which are used in the next sections. Proposition 6. Let F be a union stable system and BF its basis. Then (a) If N B F, we de®ne the partition fB 1 ; B 2 ; . . . ; B p g of the basis BF by 
Proposition 7. Let F be a union stable system and BF its basis. Let F A F with jF j V 2. Then, F can be written as a union of supports of size at least two.
Proof. It is clear that F is a union of supports B i , i A I , with non-empty intersections. If jB j j 1, there is B k , k A I , k 0 j such that B k X B j 0 q, and hence B j J B k and jB k j V 2. Therefore F can be written as a union of supports of size at least two with a non-empty intersection. r
The position value: properties and axiomatization
We now consider the F-restricted game and the conference game, derived from a cooperative game and a union stable system F.
De®nition 5. Let N; v be a cooperative game in coalitional form and F J 2 N a union stable system. The F-restricted game v F :
The F-restricted game measures the economic values of the coalitions assuming that the entire cooperation structure given by F can be considered. Thus, the F-restricted game focuses on the role of a player in creating eco-nomic possibilities and establishing meaningful communication among the players. De®nition 6. Let N; v be a cooperative game and F J 2 N a union stable system. Let B be the basis of F and
The game C; v C is well de®ned since for each A J C, its closure A is a union stable system. The conference game measures the economic value of the grand coalition when speci®c parts of the cooperation structure are considered. Note that if the game N; v is zero-normalized, i.e., vfig 0 for all
ES is a connected subgraph of N; Eg, is a union stable system. The two above de®nitions extend the point game and the arc game respectively. The arc game was introduced by Borm, Owen, and Tijs [1] , and for this situation we have that C ffi; jg : fi; jg A Eg.
A union stable cooperation structure is a triple N; v; F where N f1; . . . ; ng is the set of players, N; v is a game v : 2 N 3 R with vq 0, and F a union stable system. For convenience, we assume from now on that the underlying game N; v is zero-normalized.
The position value for graph communication situations was ®rst introduced in Meesen [3] and studied in Borm, Owen and Tijs [1] . This value was extended to hypergraphs communication situations in van den Nouweland, Borm and Tijs [7] . Now, this value will be de®ned in a union stable cooperation structure, by assigning to each support its Shapley value in the conference game and then dividing the value of each support equally among its participants. Let N; v; F be a union stable cooperation structure. On C J B, we have de®ned the game C; v C that is called the conference game. Therefore, we can consider the Shapley value associated to the game C; v C , FC; v C A R C . De®nition 7. Let N; v; F be a union stable cooperation structure. For i A N the position value p i N; v; F is given by 
The set of all union stable cooperation structures on N will be denoted by US N fN; v; F : F is union stableg. An allocation rule on US N is a map g that assigns to each union stable cooperation structure N; v; F a payov ector, gN; v; F A R N which is component-e½cient and component-dummy:
In order to prove that the position value is an allocation rule, we need the following result. Lemma 1. Let N; v; F be a union stable cooperation structure with N B F and C; v C the associated conference game. De®ne the partition fD 1 ; D 2 ; . . . ;
The equality in the second line follows directly from proposition 6 (b) (iii). Proof. We ®rst prove that the position value satis®es component-dummy.
If i B 6 M A C F N M, this player is not in any feasible coalition. Therefore C i q and p i N; v; F 0, by de®nition.
To prove component-e½ciency, let M A C F N. Then either jMj 1 or jMj > 1. If jMj 1, then M fig and C i q. Hence,
Suppose on the contrary that C A C i and C 0 B k for all k A K. Then, we have C X NnM 0 q. Moreover, since i A M X C, it follows that M W C A F, but this contradicts that M A C F N. Therefore, applying lemma 1 and using the properties of the Shapley value: 
where F H C; v C 0, since H is a super¯uous support and hence a null player in the conference game C; v C . Therefore, for all i A N,
This implies that it su½ces to prove that F C C; v C F C CnfHg; v CnfHg , for all C A CnfHg. Applying the Shapley formula,
where gS s À 1!c À s!=c!; s jSj; c jCj. To each coalition S J C which contains the super¯uous support H corresponds ± when H is deleted ± a coalition which does not contain it, and this relation is bijective. Therefore,
Let N; v; F be a union stable cooperation structure. The in¯uence of a player i is given by I i N; v; F P C A C i 1=jCj. The triple N; v; F A US N is called support anonymous if there exists a function f : f0; 1; . . . ; jCjg 3 R such that v C A f jAj; for all A J C, i.e., if the conference game C; v C is anonymous.
An allocation rule g : US N 3 R N has the in¯uence property if for each N; v; F A US N that is support anonymous there exists an a A R such that g i N; v; F aI i N; v; F, for all i A N.
So, if the value of the grand coalition only depends on the number of supports that are present, the payo¨s to the players are proportional to its in¯uence. Proof. Consider N; v; F A US N that is support anonymous. This means that the game C; v C is anonymous, hence F C C; v C v C C=jCj, for all C A C. Thus, for all i A N, we have
We may conclude with the choice of a v C C=jCj. r
The following example illustrates the in¯uence property of the position value in a union stable cooperation structure. Proof. Let S J T. If fS i g i A I is not contained in fT j g j A J , then there is S k , k A I , such that S k 0 T j , for all j A J. Hence, T 6 j A J T j 6 j A J T j W S k since S k J S J T, and consequently, the expression of T as a union of supports is not unique in contradiction with the hypothesis. The converse is obvious. r
Next, we obtain an axiomatic characterization of the position value on the class of the union stable cooperation structures N; v; F such that:
(1) For all S; T A F, with jS X Tj V 2 we have S X T A F.
(2) All non-unitary feasible coalitions can be written in a unique way as a union of non-unitary supports.
We will denote by USI N the subclass of US N where the above two conditions are true. The following result is a generalization of the characterization for the position value given by Borm, Owen and Tijs [1] , since in a communication situation the non-unitary supports are the edges of the graph and the feasible coalitions are the connected ones and the subclass of communication situations for which the communication graphs do not contain cycles satisfy the two above conditions. Theorem 4. The position value is the unique allocation rule on USI N that sat-is®es additivity, the super¯uous support property and the in¯uence property.
Proof. To prove uniqueness, let p; g : USI N 3 R N be two allocation rules that satisfy the three properties. We prove that pN; v; F gN; v; F. The game N; v is zero-normalized and v P fTJN:jTjV2g a T u T , where u T are the unanimity games. Moreover, since p and g are additive allocation rules, it su½ces to show pN; au T ; F gN; au T ; F for all T J N; jTj V 2; a A R. Two cases will be distinguished:
(a) There exists a coalition S A F such that T J S. (b) There is no coalition S A F such that T J S.
We ®rst consider (b). As there is no coalition S A F such that T J S
which implies that the conference game associated to au T is the null game, and consequently, F C C; au T C 0, for all C A C. So p i N; au T ; F 0, for all i A N. On the other hand, if au T C 0, it means that each support of C is super¯uous and hence gN; au T ; F gN; au T ; BnC. Moreover, the triple N; au T ; BnC is support anonymous and then the in¯uence property implies that there is a b A R such that gN; au T ; BnC bI N; au T ; BnC 0. Therefore pN; au T ; F gN; au T ; F 0. Now consider (a). By assumption, the set fF A F : T J F g is non-empty and de®ne T 7fF A F : T J F g. We have that T 0 q and by condition (1) of USI N it follows that T A F. It is also immediate that T is the minimal feasible set that contains the set T. Proposition 7 implies there are B i A C such that T 6 i A I B i . Thus, the conference game associated to au T is
Moreover, T A A D fB i g i A I J A, since each non-unitary feasible coalition can be written in a unique way as a union of non-unitary supports. Hence
Notice that all supports B A C such that B B fB i g i A I , are super¯uous in the conference game, and so the super¯uous support property implies that pN; au T ; F pN; au T ; F H ; and gN; au T ; F gN; au T ; F H ;
The conference game associated to au T in F H is support anonymous since,
Hence, applying the in¯uence property for the allocation rules p and g, there is a b; d A R such that pN; au T ; F H dI N; au T ; F H and gN; au T ; F H bI N; au T ; F H . So, if i A NnT then I i N; au T ; F H 0, and therefore p i N;
and thus, X
Subtracting, P i A T b À dI i N; au T ; F H 0, and as for T A C F H N it is satis®ed that P i A T I i N; au T ; F H 0 0, it is deduced that b d. r
Convexity
We study now the conditions under which the convexity is inherited from the underlying game to the conference game and we show that under the same conditions the position value is in the core of the restricted game. Shapley [11] showed that a game N; v is convex if and only if vT
In the following result we will extend this condition. For this we will use that a game N; v is convex if and only if vT W R À vT V vS W R À vS; for all S J T J NnR. where T i X T j q; i 0 j, and S i J T i , for all i.
Proof. Let S i J T i for all i and T i X T j q. It is satis®ed that
Following in the same way:
Proof. We have to prove that given
Taking into account the de®nition of the conference game, this boils down to X
vS:
Let C T N fT 1 ; T 2 ; . . . ; T k g W fT k1 ; T k2 ; . . . ; T h g such that T i X C 0 q for all i 1; . . . ; k and T i X C q for all i k 1; . . . ; h. Let i 1; . . . ; k, we ®rst show that jT i X Cj 1. Suppose jT i X Cj V 2, then T i X C A F, since N; v; F A USI N and T i X C 0 C because otherwise C J T i and then C A T but this contradicts the fact that T J CnfCg. As T i X C J T i A T and T i X C A F, then T i X C is either a support or a union of non-unitary supports of T. Hence, since C C W T i X C and T i X C 0 C, we deduce that C could be expressed in two di¨erent ways as a union of supports contradicting that N; v; F A USI N . Clearly, T 1 X C 0 q; . . . ; T k X C 0 q, and
Moreover, as we showed above, every T 1 ; . . . ; T k contains a unique element of C. For this reason, the maximal feasible coalitions of N in T W fCg will be fT 1 W Á Á Á W T k W C; T k1 ; T k2 ; . . . ; T h g. Therefore, we obtain
An analogous reasoning leads to
with S i A C S N, S i X C 0 q; i 1; . . . ; p and each S i contains a unique element of C. Consequently, the following inequality remains to be proved:
On the other hand, since S J T we have S J T and if S i is a maximal feasible coalition of N in S, then S i J T i for a unique maximal feasible coalition T i of N in T. So, p U k and without loss of generality S 1 J T 1 ; . . . ; S p J T p .
Since S i J T i they must contain the same element of C, hence S i X C T i X C. Notice that C H J C HH J C, therefore we have that C HH C H W C HH nC H J C, and for each T j , where j p 1; . . . ; k, there is an element s j A C HH nC H such that s j A T j and consequently s j 0 si for all i; j A f p 1; . . . ; kg; i 0 j. By lemma 3, convexity of N; v implies
À Á Á Á À vS p À vfsp 1g À Á Á Á À vfskg À vC H :
By simplifying the above expression and taking into account that the game N; v is zero-normalized, we ®nd
we may conclude that the inequality 1 is satis®ed. r
We now describe the core of the F-restricted game in terms of the feasible coalitions. Proof. By theorem 5, C; v C is convex and, therefore FC; v C A Cv C . We ®rst show that FC; v C V 0. By de®nition
So, we have to prove v C S W fCg À v C S V 0. By convexity of v C we have v C S W fCg À v C S V v C fCg, therefore it su½ces to show that v C fCg V 0. Indeed, v C fCg P T A C fCg N vT vC V 0 since v is superadditive and zero-normalized. As F C C; v C V 0 then pN; v; F A R N . We now prove that P i A N p i N; v; F v F N. Putting C F N fN 1 ; . . . ; N k g, we have Finally, we prove that P i A S p i N; v; F V vS; for all S A F, S 0 q. If S is a unitary coalition fig, p i N; v; F V vfig 0. If S is not a unitary coalition, as S is feasible, it is a union of non-unitary supports. Moreover, this expression is unique. Thus, let S 6 k A K S k ; S k A C. Then
As C i K fS k : i A S k g and F C C; v C V 0, we obtain that
since S A fS k g k A K and S 6 k A K S k . The last inequality is due to the fact that F C C; v C A Cv C . r
